activity and the strategy adopted by the secondary user. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium and the best response for the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium are analyzed for all the possible strategies adopted by the secondary user. Simulations results show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in terms of greater secondary user payoff and robustness against noise uncertainty.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Recent studies on wireless spectrum demonstrate that the wireless communication systems suffer from inefficient spectrum usage in the licensed portions of the spectrum [1] . Reformation in the existing spectrum assignment policies is essential such that the new policy schemes would allow opportunistic use of the licensed spectrum by the unlicensed users. Cognitive Radio (CR) offers a promising solution to overcome the inefficient spectrum usage problem and anticipated to make this policy reformation successful. The licensed users are referred as primary users and the unlicensed users as secondary users in the context of CR.
CRs are devices that can alter its parameters based on the dynamically changing environment and opportunistically occupy the licensed spectrum without causing interference to the incumbent [2] .
The fundamental task called spectrum sensing enables the CR to identify the idle portions of the primary spectrum. Spectrum sensing algorithms should be efficient to identify the idle portions accurately. Moreover, reliable spectrum sensing is highly challenging in the presence of noise uncertainty. A review of literature presents a number of spectrum sensing algorithms. Energy detection [3] , matched filtering [4] , cyclostationary feature detection [5] , covariance based detection [6] , Eigen value based detection [7] , detection using wavelets [8] and filter bank spectrum estimation [9] are few among them. The performance of the existing spectrum sensing algorithms provide trade-offs between detection accuracy, computational complexity and sensing time. But their practical applicability depends very much on the information available about the primary signals. Energy detection is the most preferred approach for spectrum sensing when the CR is unable to gather sufficient information about the primary user signals.
Originally, the energy detector is proposed for the detection of an unknown deterministic signal considering a flat band-limited Gaussian channel [10] . In the last decade, the energy detector proposed in [10] is being used for spectrum sensing to a large extend because of its simplicity and low computational complexity. Analytical and simulated performance analysis of energy detection for AWGN and fading channel models and various improved versions of energy detectors can be found in [11] [12] [13] [14] . There are several contributions in which the spectrum sensing algorithms are analyzed under noise uncertainty [15 -18] . In [15] , the authors describe the existence of SNR wall below which detection performance cannot be obtained effectively. The performance of energy detection under Log Normal approximation of noise uncertainty is analyzed in [16] . The authors of [17] assume a uniform distribution for noise uncertainty and analyzed the performance of energy detection. A generalized energy detector is analyzed under noise uncertainty in [18] and observed that the traditional energy detector (TED) is best suited for spectrum sensing under noise uncertainty. An optimized and improved energy detection algorithm can be found in [19] . Issues related to the future of spectrum sensing are covered in [20] .
On the other hand, cooperative spectrum sensing is proposed to enhance the sensing performance of the secondary users [21] . There are numerous contributions which employ evolutionary game theory for cooperative spectrum sensing [22] [23] . The authors of [22] present the spectrum sensing as an evolutionary game and develop a model for whether and when to share the sensing results for cooperative spectrum sensing. A distributed spectrum sensing game using evolutionary theory is designed for CR with heterogeneous traffic [23] . Another spectrum sensing model is formulated as an evolutionary game to study the selfish behaviour of the secondary users [24] .
Most of the contributions based on game theory take advantage of cooperative spectrum sensing to achieve performance enhancements. In addition to spectrum sensing, other CR related issues such as spectrum sharing, spectrum access, security concerns are modelled using game theory [25] [26] [27] .
In this paper, we first propose a refined energy detection (RED) algorithm for spectrum sensing which is superior to the TED. The RED algorithm uses an arbitrary positive p instead of squaring to compute the decision metric and also takes advantage of the past history of decision metric to improve the detection performance. Then we extend the RED algorithm suitable for spectrum sensing under noise uncertainty by incorporating a dual threshold and using game theory principles. The Bayesian belief update algorithm is employed to study the spectrum occupancy records from the past statistics. We observe significant performance improvements in terms of greater secondary user payoffs and low probability of error. The major contributions addressed in this paper are thus summarized: 1. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first attempt to use the game theory based decision making for spectrum sensing in the presence of noise uncertainty.
2. First, the detection probability and false alarm probability of the proposed RED is derived. The optimum value of p maximizing the detection probability is identified.
The performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed in terms of the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) and compared with the existing schemes. The total probability of sensing error and the sample complexity is analyzed against varying SNR.
4.
A dual threshold is employed for the RED algorithm under noise uncertainty.
Concepts from game theory are used to arrive at a decision. The best response is analysed for all the strategies played by the secondary user based on the primary user availability. The secondary user payoff is evaluated and compared for both with and without noise uncertainty.
II. SPECTRUM SENSING PRELIMINARIES
The CR spectrum sensing can be formulated as a binary hypothesis testing problem as follows.
where H0 is the hypothesis denoting the absence of the primary user and H1 is the hypothesis denoting the presence of the primary user. y(n) is the signal received by the secondary user, w(n)
is the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) of variance 2 w  and s(n) is the primary user signal with variance 2 w  and assumed to be real Gaussian. Moreover, s(n) and w(n) are assumed to be independent of each other. The TED uses squaring operation to compute the decision statistic, given by
where Y is the decision statistic and N is the number of samples used for computation. Y is compared with a pre-evaluated threshold  . IfY   , the decision is H1, otherwise H0. useful. The ROC of the TED algorithm is given by [14] ,
where,
The TED has well-known detection performance drawbacks and its performance depends on factors like SNR, N and  . To enhance the performance of the TED algorithm, we propose the RED algorithm which is explained in the following section.
III. REFINED ENERGY DETECTION ALGORITHM FOR SPECTRUM SENSING
The enhanced energy detector (EED) proposed in [14] makes use of an arbitrary positive power p to compute the test statistic instead of squaring operation. The modified decision statistic of the improved energy detector Ym with p th power summer is given by,
where m  is the modified decision threshold. For any p, () p yn are independent and identically distributed random variables. Using [14] , the mean and variance of () p yn is given by, Under H0:
Under H1:
As the random variables () p yn follow normal distribution [14] , the modified test statistic also follows normal distribution with mean and variance values given by,
The Pd and Pf of the improved energy detector is given by [14] ,   H0. This additional check helps to avoid any false alarms due to instantaneous signal energy drops [12] . The average signal energy of the past L sensing instants is computed as,
As the test statistic values of the past instants j = i, i-1, …i-L are assumed to follow normally distribution, their average decision statistic also follow normal distribution as given by,
The average mean and variance of avg j m Y can be evaluated as [12] ,
where M is the number of times the primary user is actually present out of the past L sensing 
The corresponding false alarm probability r f P is given by,
The probabilities of detection and false alarm of the RED algorithm are bounded by the EED. The degradation in false alarm probability is also observed from (17) . As the probabilities depend on the value of p, it is possible to find an optimum p which maximizes 2 2
The solution for (18) is obtained numerically as it is difficult to obtain its solution in closed form.
It is found that the p * depends on N, SNR and Pf. Thus p * can be computed offline for various values of SNR, N and Pf. For practical sensing, for a given N, Pf and the estimated SNR, p * can be chosen from the offline computed values. The RED algorithm is summarized in Table 1 . 
RED ALGORITHM UNDER NOISE UNCERTAINTY
In this section, we describe the game theory based decision making technique for the secondary user in the presence of noise uncertainty. The threshold obtained using (11) directly depends on the noise power 2 w  which is difficult to estimate accurately. Practically, the average noise power 2 w  is known and it is different from the actual noise power 2 w  . The noise power changes with time and location and is therefore uncertain. We assume the noise power uncertainty to be uniformly distributed in the interval [17] as given by,
where  is the factor describing the noise uncertainty. Under noise uncertainty,  >1. If noise uncertainty is absent,  =1. Noise uncertainty is can also be expressed in dB, denoted as del = 
Using (22) and (23), the decision regarding the presence or absence of the primary user is obtained as explained below. The RED decision statistic is compared with the upper and lower thresholds. If it exceeds u m  , the decision is H1. If it falls below u m  , the decision is H0. If it falls in between the two threshold, the secondary user choose any of the three options (i.e.,) sense again, decide H1, decide H0. he block diagram of the proposed RED algorithm is shown in Figure. 1.
Based on the strategies, a dynamic game is formulated and explained in detail in the following section. Figure. 1 Block diagram of the proposed RED algorithm
VI. DECISION MAKING USING GAME THEORY
The secondary user spectrum sensing is formulated as a decision making problem when the algorithm decision statistic falls in between the upper and lower thresholds. The primary user is the incumbent and has the right to use its spectrum when it desires. Thus the primary user is either ON or OFF based on its state of requirement. On the other hand, the secondary user's intention is use the primary spectrum to the maximum without violating the spectrum etiquette.
The secondary user is uncertain about the primary user ON-OFF activity pattern. Let the probability that the primary is in the ON state be p1. The actions taken by the primary user is from its strategy space Ap = {access, don't access}. The secondary user chooses its actions from the strategy space As = {sense, access, silent}. The payoff for the primary user is always the spectrum gain irrespective of the secondary user's move. The payoff matrix of the secondary user corresponding to any particular game stage is shown in Table 2 . We define the following notations to formulate the secondary user payoff matrix [10] .
Gdenotes the spectrum gain. For example, the spectrum gain is the bandwidth attained by the secondary user. Csdenotes the sensing cost. It applies to the secondary user if it decides to sense the spectrum when the spectrum is actually occupied. For example, the cost refers to the energy consumed by the secondary user for sensing.
Pdenotes the penalty incurred by the secondary user when it causes interference to the primary user. For example, the secondary user may be forbidden to use the spectrum for a particular amount of time.
Rdenotes the reward for the secondary user and it applies if it does not cause interference to the primary user.
We assume that the relationship between the parameters follow P > G > Cs and R > Cs. The reasons behind the constraints are as follows:
The interference caused to the primary user is highly unacceptable. This constraint ensures that the secondary user would not access the spectrum to avoid interference to the primary user.
G > Cs: This is the constraint which ensures that the secondary user gains incentives for spectrum access. Otherwise, the secondary user will be reluctant to use the spectrum if the additional sensing cost exceeds the spectrum gain.
R > Cs: The reason behind this constraint is to assure that the secondary user gain incentives for a correct decision. access with the payoff G. If it chooses to be silent, it loses the free spectrum with a payoff of -G.
On the other hand, if it chooses to sense, in addition to spectrum loss it incurs positive sensing cost and the total payoff is -G+Cs. The sensing cost is positive because when the primary user is OFF, additional sensing may result in a positive decision for the secondary user.
a. Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium analysis A specific action that the player will follow in every possible attainable situation is defined as pure strategy. In game theory context, a particular strategy ' i s of player i is strictly dominated than his other strategy si if,
u  refer to the payoff of the player i. A two player game has unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if each player has a dominant strategy [27] .
The primary user has the highest priority as has the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium as spectrum gain. Thus, we analyze the Nash equilibrium for the secondary user.
Lemma 1:
As the primary user does not maintain one particular state (OFF or ON), pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for the secondary user.
Proof: Table 1 shows that the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the secondary user is choosing silent when the primary user is ON. For the second case when the primary user is OFF, the purestrategy Nash equilibrium for the secondary user is choosing access. As the primary user does not maintain a single state, the game will not converge to unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the player. Thus, we analyze the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for the secondary user.
b. Mixed Strategy Nash equilibrium analysis
The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is investigated by assigning probabilities to the pure strategy space which refers to how frequency each pure strategy is played. Here the game is a single player decision making process and hence we define the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium based on the probability of the primary user being ON. The mixed strategy space of the secondary user is defined as {sense, access, silent}. The choice of the mixed strategy such that the secondary user attains a best response is analyzed. Proof: The game tree for a single game stage is shown in Figure. 3 for the secondary user. The expected payoff for the secondary user can be calculated as follows.
Figure. 3 Game tree showing all possible actions for the secondary user
The expected secondary user payoff for all the actions in the space As is given by,
It should be noted that the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium can be found by finding the best response for the secondary user as a function of probability of primary user being ON.
It can be readily obtained from the plot of the payoff function given by (24) , (25) and (26) Equating (24) and (25),
Equating (24) and (26),
The best response (BR) for the secondary user is thus given by,
In practice, the value of p1 is unknown to the secondary user. In order to find its strategy, the secondary should develop a model to estimate the value of p1 from the past statistics. We use the basic Bayesian belief update algorithm with weighted coefficients to estimate the probability of primary user being ON [27] . The Bayesian belief update with weighted coefficients to update the belief of secondary user during any j th stage is given by, Thus the strategy for the secondary user can be set based on its own belief about the primary user.
To summarize, the actions taken by the secondary user are given as follows:
For the primary user,  If there is a need to transmit, then access the spectrum.
 The probability of being ON for the primary user is p1 and being OFF is 1-p1. In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 , we obtain the curve of Pd against p for the RED and TED algorithms. It is observed for the TED algorithm that there exists a maximum Pd for a particular value of p. This is the optimum p which improves the detection performance for the given Pf, N and SNR. Similarly, a global maximum value is observed for Pd for the RED algorithm and it is greater than the TED algorithm. The optimal p also depends on the past observations (i.e), the number of times the primary signal is actually present M. This is due to the fact that the average mean and variance is a direct function of M.
Thus it can be concluded that the incorporating the past observations with TED greatly improve the detection performance. Figure. 5 and Figure. 6 also show that the optimum value of p depends on the value of Pf.
To illustrate the benefit of the operator 'p' in the RED algorithm, we evaluate the optimum p for varying Pf. As seen from Figure. 7 . The ROC curves are obtained using (3), (11), (12) , (16) and (17) with Pf = 0.1, SNR = -10dB, N=1000 and M = [0, L]. As it is appreciated, the performance is upper bounded by the RED algorithm. We also consider the IED is the improved energy detection algorithm proposed in [12] for comparison. When M=0, the IED performance coincides with TED because the sensing outcome is mostly based on the current sensing event. But an improved performance is obtained for the same with optimal p using RED. As M increases, errors caused due to misdetections are avoided resulting in an improved performance. For any M, the RED performance is found to be superior. In Figure. 12, the number of samples required for all the three algorithms is observed against SNR for a target Pd and Pf. For TED, the sample complexity is determined easily using eq (3), whereas for IED and RED it is obtained numerically. It is great to note that the proposed RED method requires less number of samples over IED and TED algorithms.
d. RED Algorithm under noise uncertainty
In this section, we conduct numerical analysis and express the secondary user payoff over game stages. The parameters used the game theory analysis are assumed as follows: P = 100, R = 100, G = 50 and Cs = 20. The following probability values are assumed for the primary user activity, p1= 0.05, 0.2, 0.35 and 0.5. The secondary user is not aware of these actual values and hence start with an initial value of p1 = 0.5. As the game progresses, the secondary user updates its belief.
Initially, we study the secondary user payoff under various noise uncertainty factors and compare with the TED algorithm. Figure. 13 and Figure. The decrease in the average payoff against p1 is evident as the increase in the primary user being ON will offer less spectral opportunities for the secondary user. Finally, we show that for increasing false alarm probability, the average secondary user payoff initially increases and becomes approximately constant in Figure. 16. This is because for low values of false alarm, the detection probability is also low and increases with increasing false alarm probability as evident from the ROC performance.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a RED algorithm is proposed for spectrum sensing to enhance the performance of sensing accuracy. First, the probability of detection and false alarm of the proposed RED algorithm is derived. The optimal value of p which maximizes the detection performance is identified. The ROC performance, sensing error and sample complexity against SNR of the RED algorithm are observed and found to outperform the existing algorithms. Then the RED algorithm is extended for improving the sensing performance against noise uncertainty. A dynamic game is formulated between the primary user and the secondary user in which the primary user has the highest priority. Secondary user sensing strategies are devised when it is unable to make a hard decision regarding the state of the primary user. The expected secondary user payoff is calculated taking into account the actions played by the secondary user. The probability of choosing a particular strategy such that the secondary user payoff is maximized is analyzed. The Bayesian based belief update algorithm with weighted coefficients is used to build a decision about the state of the primary user. Simulation results validate the efficacy of the proposed RED algorithm and found to be superior over the existing schemes in terms of ROC, greater secondary user payoff and better robustness against noise uncertainty.
